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The author distinguishes between state, process, and object perspectives on institutions and institutionalization. While all-purpose process approaches dominate the literature, the author argues that these are analytically insufficient without theorizing the nature of “institutional objects.” Building on recently developed analytic disaggregations of the culture concept in cultural sociology, the author argues that doings, sayings, codes, and artifacts exhaust the broad classes of potential objects subject to institutionalization processes. The proposed approach provides a coherent ontology for future empirical work, features robust microfoundations, places institutional routines and practices in a material context, and acknowledges the importance of semiotic codes and vocabularies in organizational fields.

Purpose – In recent decades, some sociologists have turned to evolutionary biology, neuroscience, and cognitive science to support, modify, and reconfigure existing social psychological theory. In this chapter, we build on this momentum by considering the relevance of current work in affective and cognitive neuroscience for understanding emotions and the self. Our principal aim is to enlarge the range of phenomena currently considered by sociologists who study emotion while showing how affective dynamics play an important role across most outcomes and processes of interest to social scientists.

Approach – We focus on the ways external social objects become essential to, and emotionally significant for, the self. To that end, we draw on ideas from phenomenology, pragmatism, classic symbolic interactionism, and dramaturgy. We show how basic affective systems graft on, build from, and extend current social psychological usages of emotions as well as the important sociological work being done on self, from both symbolic interactionist (SI) and identity theory (IT) perspectives. Finally, we turn to the promising directions in studying emotional biographies and various aspects related to embodiment.

Findings – Affective systems consist of brain networks whose connections deepen when activated, with interesting variations observable at the neural, individual, and social levels in which one or more system is more salient than others. Affective systems may come to saturate the construction and maintenance of an autobiography or collective biography, with consequences for self-projection, self-other attunement, and embodied action. In turning to embodiment, however, we consider aspects of cognitive neuroscience that can contribute to ongoing work in neurosociology building on symbolic interactionism.

Practical Implications – The focus on affective systems suggests new research agendas in leveraging emerging neurosociological methods in the laboratory, while pushing for novel, naturalistic observational strategies. The latter, in particular, may be key to deepening sociology's contributions to neuroscience, better positioned to bring the full disciplinary toolkit to bear on these questions.

Social Implications – In considering the embodied and projective aspects of the self, we show how work examining convergence and divergence between embodied and linguistic pathways opens up new insights into how the self develops or acquires behavioral repertoires. As such, this chapter points to the need for holistic approach to understanding the social actor and, thereby, how political, economic, historical, and cultural factors shape self as much as biogenetic and psychological.

Originality of the Chapter – Sociologists think of emotions as either dependent or intervening variables: (1) signaling identity or situational incongruence, (2) states to be managed, and (3) structural dimensions of superordinate–subordinate relationships. Our integration of the theory of affective systems emphasizes the causal primacy emotions have over other behavioral and cognitive functions, clarifying how they play into the construction and maintenance of self and social experience.

Traditionally, organizational theory has been a receptacle of methods and mechanisms from network theory. In this paper, we argue that organizational theory can also be an active contributor to network theory’s conceptual development. To that end, we make explicit a theoretical strategy that has only been used informally by network theorists so far, which – following Vaughan (2002) – we refer to as analogical theorizing. Using the basic correspondence between dyadic relationships as the most minimal form of “organization,” we show that processes and mechanisms extracted from various theoretical strands of organizational theory can be mapped onto the dynamics of social relationships. This allows us to build novel theoretical insight as it pertains to issue of relationship emergence, maintenance, and decay in social networks.

Philosophical reflection is a reflection of a school’s organizational structure. This study employs formal and computational methods to examine closely the culture/structure duality in the Frankfurt School’s formation and fragmentation over several decades by examining the homology between its social and conceptual networks.

On the one side, I produce social structural data from archival research on the Frankfurt School’s set of social relations. On the other side, I use computer-assisted textual analysis to produce concept maps of key texts by the same thinkers. Analyzing these networks jointly, I then investigate the dyadic social and cultural processes that contributed to the school’s fragmentation and show that:

1. The Frankfurt School’s social structure and idea structure were positively correlated over three decades as the school moved from an era of social and intellectual coherence to an era of fragmentation.

2. While we normally imagine the duality of structure and culture as a positive correlation between social and cultural relations, it can also appear as a strong negative correlation. Leo Löwenthal’s expulsion from the school is such a case. As a peripheral member, Löwenthal’s attempt to engage more strongly with the school’s core ideas was interpreted as presumptuous and low quality by core members who strictly policed the social and intellectual structure of the school. As a result of his ambition, Löwenthal was expelled.

The Frankfurt School’s social structure and idea structure were positively correlated over three decades as the school moved from an era of social and intellectual coherence to an era of fragmentation.

While we normally imagine the duality of structure and culture as a positive correlation between social and cultural relations, it can also appear as a strong negative correlation. Leo Löwenthal’s expulsion from the school is such a case. As a peripheral member, Löwenthal’s attempt to engage more strongly with the school’s core ideas was interpreted as presumptuous and low quality by core members who strictly policed the social and intellectual structure of the school. As a result of his ambition, Löwenthal was expelled.

This paper develops a semantic network approach to analyzing the relation between structural and cultural ties while illustrating the complex ways in which cultural and structural facets of a philosophical school develop in a duality.

The “first generation” (Lammers, 1978, p. 486) of comparative analysis of organizations in sociology (e.g., Blau, 1965; Stinchcombe, 1959) focused on the “nuts and bolts” of organizational structure as the key criterion with which to derive organizational typologies (Perrow, 1967; Pugh, Hickson, & Hinings, 1969). This initial cohort of analysts saw the intrinsic features – or “organizational attributes” (Blau, 1965, p. 326) – constitutive of the “technical core” of the organization, such as features related to the organization of the production process (Perrow, 1967) or the structure of allocation of discretion and authority (e.g., Etzioni, 1961), as the royal road to the development of a cogent approach to comparative analysis of organizations.

Comparative organizational analysis once dominated American organizational sociology, grounded in rich case studies about organizational processes and outcomes. The Columbia school's approach to organizational research was exemplary in this regard. Following the publication of Robert K. Merton's (1940) essay, “Bureaucratic Structure and Personality,” he attracted a group of talented doctoral students to his formal organizations seminar (Crothers, 1990), the core of whom would go on to write dissertations, books, and articles forming the substance of American organizational sociology in the decades to come. Among those students were Philip Selznick, Alvin Gouldner, Peter Blau, Seymour Martin Lipset, Rose Coser, and James Coleman. While their work varied greatly in substantive content, their studies shared a theoretical interest in explaining intra-organizational dynamics and the unexpected outcomes of bureaucratic administration. Organizations, they demonstrated, developed “lives of their own,” quite outside the intents of their founders (Haveman, 2009; refer, especially, Selznick, 1957). Organizations, in other words, were adaptive to the needs of their constituents, but adaptations did not always produce the intended results. One of the unintended consequences of organizational development was increasing variety in the kinds of organizations that emerged to meet particular societal goals or ends. Thus, an inherent focus of this early comparative research was the explanation of variety in organizational types, policies, and outcomes and an emphasis on the ways in which organizations diverged from ideal types.

We argue for a broadened approach to brokerage by distinguishing between brokerage emphasizing a particular structural pattern in which two otherwise disconnected alters are connected through a third party (“brokerage structure”) and the social behavior of third parties (“brokerage process”). We explore a processual view of brokerage by examining three fundamental strategic orientations toward brokerage: conduit, tertius gaudens, and tertius iungens that occur in many different forms and combinations. This processual view is especially relevant in increasingly complex and dynamic environments where brokerage behavior is highly varied, intense, and purposeful, and has theoretical implications for studying multiplexity, heterogeneity, and brokerage intensity.

In 2010, the author published a practical critique of some of Karl Weick's writings, to which Weick offered a rejoinder. The purpose of this paper is to use his response as an occasion to reflect on the rhetorical conditions of critique in the sensemaking tradition.

This paper provides a rhetorical analysis of Weick's response to the author's critique, showing that it is directed at the ethos of the critic. For the purpose of the analysis, ethos is conventionally defined as the character, competence and goodwill of the speaker.

The analysis shows that Weick's dismissal of the author's critique suggests the lack of a “dwelling place” (the primordial sense of “ethos” in pre‐Socratic Greek) for critical scholarship in sensemaking research.

All scholarly communities need a space for the critical evaluation of the claims their members make. In an attempt to establish such a place, the author counters the standard disciplinary pedagogy of sensemaking, which is inspired by Lave and Wenger's “legitimate peripheral participation”, with a call for legitimate peripheral irritation.